Saturday, August 27, 2011

The Moral Argument

In order to better organize this post I will distinguish between moral argument A concerning moral values and moral argument B concerning moral obligations. A basic formulation of the moral argument mashes both together in a single argument that runs like this:


(1) If god does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
(2) Objective moral values and duties exist.
(3) Therefore god exists.


Now I believe that (1) is true of moral duties and not of moral values. I also believe that (2) is true of moral values but not of moral duties. So to be able to focus on each premise of contention without skipping around lacking organization, I will distinguish between moral argument A and moral argument B. I will discuss argument A first.


A1. If god does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
A2. Objective moral values exist.
A3. Therefore god exists.


Clearly in order to discuss and understand this argument we need to define what we mean by "objective moral values". By "objective" we certainly mean that something is true independent of any opinion. This metaphysical objectivity contrasts with epistemological objectivity in which we mean that an idea was formed in an unbiased manner. "Moral values" refers to whether or not some action, person, event, or thing is either good or evil. Therefore by "objective moral values" it is meant that some action, person, event, or thing is truly either good or evil independently of any opinion. This leaves us with the an obvious question though, what do we mean by "good" and "evil". Trying to define these terms generically always makes the definiendum simply a restatement of the definiens, such that it hasn't actually been explained what is meant by "good" and "evil". For instance Webster defines "good" as virtuous, right, or commendable, and "evil" as morally reprehensible. These are simply synonyms and don't actually explain what the word refers to. It is clear that in order to even discuss this argument we must provide explicit definitions of what we mean when we say that something is "good" or "evil". It is worth noting here that to debate moral ontology you must first discuss moral semantics, because it makes no sense to debate whether or not something has an actual metaphysical status unless you first know what you actually mean by that something that you are debating about.


Here now we come to an obvious true dichotomy, of the form A or not-A. Either you will:


(1) Define "good" and "evil" in such a way that god has to exist in order for them to exist.


 OR


(2) Define "good" and "evil" in such a way that god does not have to exist in order for them to exist.


If you do (1), then A2 becomes obviously question begging because the only reason you would have to accept the existence of objective moral values is if you already accept the existence of god. If you do (2) then A1 becomes obviously false, for (2) is the direct negation of A1. For example, if the theist defines "good" as "that which is in accordance with god's moral nature" and "evil" as "that which is contrary to god's moral nature" (as theists often do), then there could be no argument given to prove that things are really good or evil without presupposing the existence of god, for an atheist would hold that god's moral nature does not even exist. On the other hand the atheist often wants to define "good" as "that which contributes to the well-being of  sentient creatures" and "evil" as "that which detracts from the well-being of sentient creatures". On this definition A1 is clearly false, for even if god does not exist there are still things that objectively contribute to or detract from the well-being of sentient creatures.


Since this is a true dichotomy, any and every given definition of "good" and "evil" that are provided will either make this argument question begging, or simply unsound. So it seems then that moral argument A will fail either way.


So what about moral argument B, that goes like this:


B1. If god does not exist, then objective moral duties do not exist.
B2. Objective moral duties exist.
B3. Therefore god exists.


This argument is more plausible that moral argument A but ultimately doesn't fair any better. We've already defined "objective" so for this argument all we need to define is "moral duties". A "moral duty" is something that you ought or ought not do. So then "objective moral duties" are actions that you ought or ought not do independently of any opinion. Unlike the existence of objective moral values, the existence of objective moral duties cannot be decided purely definitionally.


I agree with B1 on the basis that I would deny B2. I deny that objective moral duties exist and so I thereby agree that if god does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist. I would also affirm that if god exists, then objective moral values do not exist. Why? On the basis of Hume's Is-Ought problem. Hume observes that there is a difference between descriptive Is statements and prescriptive Ought statements. It seems that the only way to get to an Ought statement is by use of a subjective If clause, rather than an objective Is clause. For instance, imagine you are standing in front a brick wall. It would be correct to subjectively say, if I do not want to whack my head, then I ought not walk forward. But, it is not correct to say simply that there is a wall in front of me, therefore I objectively ought not walk forward. Why ought I not walk forward? It seems that if I did want to whack my head, then I ought walk forward, even though there is a wall in front of me. So I think that this gives us grounds for thinking that prescriptive Ought statements must be rooted in subjective desires rather than objective facts.


For those reasons I accept B1 and deny B2. However note that just because I already accept B1, that doesn't mean that you should just allow the theist to have B1 without holding up his burden of proof, for note that in order to prove B1 the theist would first of all have to adopt some form of the Is-Ought problem, and then not only that but also disprove every attempt that has been made to bridge the Is-Ought problem without the use of god, such as Kant's categorical imperative, Searlian style attempts, and egoistic attempts that have all been made to show that you can derive an objective prescription from purely descriptive objective statements. I also accept this as my burden of proof when giving a complete account of my acceptance of B1 and denial of B2, but to fully do that would be beyond the purview of this essay.


Now coming to B2 by itself I've already noted that I think that we have a positive objection against it in the form of Hume's Is-Ought problem, but to fully spell out that objection we would have to dispel every attempt to solve the Is-Ought problem, so let's instead turn to how the theist might argue for B2. It seems to me that, similarly to the problem with moral argument A, it is actually impossible to argue for B2 without either begging the question in B2 or disproving B1. For note what objective moral duties are, they are not some concrete, physical objects that we can simply empirically confirm the existence of, rather objective moral duties aren't entities at all. To say that objective moral duties exist is to say that some prescriptive proposition is true independent of any opinion (this is to assume a non-platonistic view of moral values and duties, however even on platonism you cannot empirically confirm the existence of objective moral duties because these are abstract objects). So how then would you prove the existence of objective moral duties, if you cannot do so empirically? The only option seems to be to offer a proof, or argument, for the existence of objective moral duties (and this indeed is how the aforementioned ethical philosophies attempt to do so). This leads inexorably to the dichotomy facing moral argument B, either you will:


(1) Make use of god in the proof of the existence of objective moral duties.


OR


(2) Not make use of god in the proof of the existence of objective moral duties.


(1) will make B2 question begging for then you show that the only reason you would have to accept the existence of objective moral duties is if you already accept the existence of god. (2) would obviously disprove B1 because (2) shows that god is not needed for the existence of objective moral duties. For instance, William Lane Craig claims that "Duty arises in response to an imperative from a competent authority...in the case of moral obligations, these arise as a result of imperatives issued by a competent authority. And in virtue of being the Good, God is uniquely qualified to issues such commands as expressions of His nature." Ignoring the issue of the truth of his argument here, it is clear that if this is how you attempt to prove B2, you will be patently question begging, for the atheist would deny that this "competent authority" and his commands even exist, and so in order to prove that these objective moral duties exist, you would have to prove that god exists. But this is what the argument is supposed to be proving, and therefore you must assume what you seek to prove in order to argue for B2.


How do theists attempt to avoid this dichotomy? Sadly, by denying that they actually have to have a proof of the existence of objective moral duties in order to show that they exist. The theist can't empirically show that objective moral duties exist, and he cannot formulate a proof of their existence on pain of either question-begging or disproving B1, how then is he going to attempt to prove his premise B2? Predictably, it is by use of the appeal to intuition. It is said that in we directly intuit that some things we really ought or ought not do, objectively. It is objectively true that we ought not rape little children for fun, the theist claims that we intuit.


While these intuitions have strong emotional appeal, considered rationally, there simply is no weight behind arguments from intuition. I will simply repeat earlier criticisms of intuition here, that  the intuition may be true for the proponent of B2, but that does not necessitate it being true for anyone else. We are free to respond that we do not share that intuition, or even that we intuit the falsity of B2. Taken alone, intuition does not count as an objective argument for B2. We should simply respond that the intuition has not been proven to be veridical. Unless the theist is adopting some strange epistemology of intuitionism, intuition will not do anything to prove B2. Human intuition has proven fallible countless times over the course of human history, such that intuition itself cannot count as a real argument for something. To say that quantum physics in unintuitive would not show that quantum physics is not true.


Finally, note that this argument would only be persuasive to someone with low justification for their atheism in the first place. For someone with good grounds for affirming atheism, they would simply say that they have better grounds for affirming the modus ponens form of the argument than the modus tollens form of the argument, such that they would replace B2 with:


*B2. God does not exist.


Yielding the conclusion:


*B3. Therefore objective moral duties do not exist.


The atheist would have to be presented with arguments sufficient to establish better grounds for affirming B2 than affirming *B2. But it seems to me that any atheist worth his salt would have better grounds for affirming *B2, especially considering the lack of good arguments even possible for establishing B2.


Therefore I think that both moral arguments A and B fail to successful establish their conclusions. Argument A faces a dichotomy that results in it either begging the question in A2 or proving that A1 is false. Argument B seems to be false due to B2 being false, not only that but I think that it is actually impossible to argue for the truth of B2 without either begging the question or disproving B1. The only way out appears to be an appeal to intuition, which clearly fails to establish the truth of B2. Finally, moral argument B would only be persuasive to an atheist with already poor grounds for affirming atheism. In my judgement then, moral arguments are the weakest of all major theistic arguments today.


Resources

  1. Does Theistic Ethics Derive an "Ought" from an "Is", William Lane Craig, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8215
  2. The Is-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical Logic, Gerhard Schurz

Tuesday, August 2, 2011

Kalam Cosmological Argument: Premise (1)

(1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause


Two arguments are given to support (1):


1A. Something cannot come into being out of nothing.
1B. This premise is constantly empirically confirmed and never falsified.


Now using 1A to support (1) seems very odd, I am not sure how 1A is supposed to prove (1). I can affirm that something cannot come into being out of nothing without affirming that everything that begins to exist has a cause. There is certainly no explicit contradiction in affirming 1A without affirming (1), so if theist wants to use 1A to support (1), he must be proposing that there is an implicit contradiction here. But then the theist needs to give us his premises that make the contradiction explicit, and this has never been done. It seems that the theist would need two further premises for 1A to support (1).


A. Nothing cannot cause anything to come into being.
B. Instances of something coming into being out of nothing are the only possible instances in which things could come into being uncaused.


If nothing could cause something to come into being, then something coming into being out of nothing that would not be a violation of the causal principle, and thus affirming 1A would not be at odds with affirming (1). So the theist needs to establish that something coming into being out of nothing would be a violation of the causal principle, therefore he needs to establish A. More controversially he also needs to establish B, for (1) requires that everything that begins to exist has a cause. Now if we grant 1A and A we have established that instances in which something comes into being out nothing cannot happen and thus (1) cannot not be disproven by such instances, however this will not prove that everything that begins to exist has a cause unless something coming into being out of nothing is the only instance in which anything could ever begin to exist uncaused. If something could come into being uncaused out of something, then 1A alone will not suffice to prove (1). The theist could however say that 1A is only meant to prove some instances of (1) being true, however then 1A will not function as an independent argument for the truth of (1) and will rely on the truth of 1B in addition to prove (1).


Now while we can grant the theist A, it seems to me that B is plausibly false. For if for instance pieces of wood spontaneously rearrange themselves into a chair, I take it that the chair has come into being uncaused out of something, and therefore B is false. This proves that 1A may be true without (1) being true, so that 1A is not a proof of (1). Now the theist may try to escape this by saying that having a material "cause" alone is enough to say that something is caused to come into being. So on this view simply having the pieces of wood is enough to show that the chair was caused to begin to exist, even though the pieces spontaneously rearranged themselves with no cause. Now I think that this view of causality is simply mistaken. A material "cause" is not in fact the cause of anything. Rather, it is what is being caused. The material "cause" in fact does not do anything in a causal relationship, rather it is the object of the causation. A material "cause" alone is not enough to say that something is caused to begin existing by any meaningful use of the term. So I think that if pieces of wood spontaneously rearrange themselves into a chair, that chair was not caused to begin to exist, and therefore B is false. The theist also has good reason to deny this view of causality because it makes (1) tautologically true for things beginning to exist within the universe. For as all of the universe is composed of material, everything that begins to exist within the universe begins to exist ex materia, and thus if a material cause alone is sufficient to say that something comes into being caused, then by definition anything beginning to exist within the universe has a cause. This renders (1) unfalsifiable within the universe, and therefore 1B will lose any force whatsoever in proving (1), for as any scientist will tell you, empirical confirmation of an unfalsifiable hypothesis is worthless and meaningless. So it seems to me that B is not only false but that the theist has good reason to maintain that B is false, so even if it is true, 1A alone will not be enough to prove (1).


Now the question arises, is 1A actually true? What arguments does the theist give us for thinking that it is? Again, there are two reasons given:


A. 1A is intuited to be true.


B1. If something could come into being out of nothing, then anything and everything would come into being out nothing.
B2. But anything and everything does not come into being out of nothing.
B3. Therefore something cannot come into being out of nothing.


Now A may be true for the proponent of A, but that does not necessitate it being true for anyone else. We are free to respond that we do not share that intuition, or even that we intuit the falsity of 1A. Taken alone, A does not count as an objective argument for 1A. We should simply respond that the intuition has not been proven to be veridical. Unless the theist is adopting some strange epistemology of intuitionism, A will not do anything to prove 1A.


Now B is a more serious attempt to prove 1A. This however does not mean that it is any more successful in doing so. B1 is not necessarily true I think, for though nothingness has no laws or regularities to determine what specifically could come into being out of it, this only proves that anything and everything could come into being out of nothing, not that anything and everything would come into being out of nothing. There is no guarantee here that anything and everything would definitely come into being out of nothing, for there is no rule or order on nothingness to impose such an absolute regularity. Now what about B2? Unfortunately, only observations within the universe are given to support B2. But clearly pointing out that no one has ever observed horses, bicycles, or Beethoven popping into being doesn't support B2, for these observations are prove that things do not pop into being out of something. We could only verify the truth of 2B in a state in which there was nothing, but if something exists then there is not nothing, and the universe exists, and is something. So we cannot verify 2B by pointing out observations within the universe, for then we are observing something and not nothing. In fact, 2B could never be verified to be true for we cannot observe nothing, as we ourselves are something. So if we obtain, then nothingness does not obtain, and therefore we cannot observe nothingness to verify 2B.


It is clear that all arguments for the truth of 1A fail. However, I think that we can go further and press a positive objection against 1A. It may be formulated as follows:


1. Nothingness has no primary positive properties. (Premise)
2. Nothingness restricting something from coming into being is a primary positive property. (Premise)
3. Therefore nothingness does not have the primary positive property of restricting something from coming into being. (From 1 and 2)
4. If there are no restrictions at all on some given event occurring, then that event occurring is possible. (Premise)
5. There are no restrictions at all on something coming into being out of nothing. (From 3)
6. Therefore it is possible for something to come into being out of nothing. (From 4 and 5)


First I will explain what I mean by "primary positive property". A positive property is a property such as materiality or temporality. A negative property is the negation of a positive property such immateriality or timelessness. A primary property is a property that is neither derived from any other more fundamental property or properties, nor divisible into any other more fundamental properties. A secondary property is either derived from other more fundamental property or properties, or is divisible into other more fundamental properties. For instance, William Lane Craig uses the primary property of god's changelessness to derive the secondary property of god's immateriality. "From the changelessness of the First Cause, its immateriality follows." -Craig, Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology p.192.


Having clarified the terms used in the argument, I will now defend its premises. Really only premise 1 and 2 are in need of defense, for 3, 5 and 6 are simply conclusions, and 4 is hardly controversial. Premise 1 is entailed by the very definition of nothingness as literal non-being, the absence of anything at all. Any "entity" (I use this for lack of a better term) which has primary positive properties is a thing, it is not no thing at all. Any "entity" which has primary positive properties is indeed something, for these properties are what constitute things. For example any "entity" which has the primary positive property of being spatial is a thing which exists in space. So premise 1 should be undeniable. Now why are negative properties not included in premise 1? This is for two reasons. The first is that the very existence of negative properties is an area of philosophical dispute, some philosophers think that these negative properties are merely negations of positive properties and do not count as actual properties in and of themselves. And thus by leaving out negative properties from premise 1, I do not assume a position either way, for regardless of whether or not you think negative properties actually exist, we can all agree that nothingness minimally lacks at least primary positive properties. In this way, I leave the argument open for philosophers on either side of that issue. The second reason for not including negative properties in premise 1 is because it seems that if negative properties do exist, then nothingness does actually have those properties. So if immateriality and timelessness are properties, then nothingness has them, for nothingness lacks time and space. Any given "entity" will either possess property A or it will not, if you accept the existence of negative properties, it will either possess property A or the property not-A, and it cannot possess both. These are simply functions of the logical absolutes. Now having established that nothingness cannot possess any primary positive property A, it follows that it must possess the negative property not-A, if such negative properties exist. As I have shown, we have good grounds for affirming that nothingness, by definition, cannot possess primary positive properties, however we have no equivalent grounds for thinking that non-being could not possess negative properties. For we do not observe that these negative properties are what actually constitute things as we do with positive properties. The positive reality of being we observe is constituted by time, space, and other such primary positive properties. And so therefore we certainly have better grounds for affirming that nothing cannot have primary positive properties, but can have negative properties, as opposed to the opposite. And since it must have one of those two, and must have only one of those two, it follows that we should affirm that nothingness has no primary positive properties but does have negative properties, at least if you believe that such properties exist. If you do not believe that such negative properties actually exist then you will simply affirm that nothingness does not have primary positive properties, without even needing to consider issue of negative properties. Now why does premise 1 specify primary positive properties and not just positive properties? Thus far we have established that nothingness cannot have primary positive properties, but, if they exist, then it has negative properties. However this seems to entail that nothingness may have certain secondary positive properties, hence why the first premise specifies primary positive properties. Remember what a secondary property is, it is either derived from other more fundamental property or properties, or is divisible into other more fundamental properties. So if the lack of a given primary positive property, or the presence of a negative property, is used to derive a positive property of nothingness, then that property is a secondary positive property of nothingness. Our argument so far has proven that nothingness lacks primary positive properties and, if they exist, has negative properties, therefore, as just explained, if any of this is used to derive a positive property of nothing, then we have proved that nothingness has secondary positive properties. I simply submit that such a derivation is possible, and thus I formulated the first premise only specifying primary positive properties in order to avoid such an issue. For whether or not you think that such a derivation can be made successfully, that it is not relevant to the property concerned in premise 2, which is a primary positive property. And hence such an objection to a more loosely formulated premise 1 (to include secondary positive properties) is not of concern, since we can merely further restrict our argument to primary positive properties. For the theist, such a derivation is often used to prove god's personhood (Craig, Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology p.193), and hence the theist has good reason to accept this stricter formulation of premise 1, though this is irrelevant.


So what about premise 2, the last controversial premise in the argument? Well clearly nothingness restricting something from coming into being is a positive property. In the "property pair" of positive property A and negative property not-A, nothingness restricting something from coming into being is the positive property A. The negative property in that "property pair" would be nothingness not restricting something from coming into being. Now is it a primary property? There seem to be no more fundamental properties in which it is derived from or is divisible into, so the answer seems to be yes. The burden of proof in this issue lies on the one who thinks that it can be derived or divided, so if the theist wants to challenge premise 2 he needs to show us this derivation or division. Unless and until the theist does that, premise 2 remains unchallenged.


Premise 3 follows obviously and immediately from 1 and 2, and 6 follows from 4 and 5 by modus ponens so the only things left to examine is premise 4 and the move from 3 to 5. All that 4 says is that if there is nothing whatsoever to restrict something from happening, that thing happening is possible. This is obviously true because when we say that something is impossible, we simply mean that there is something restricting it from happening. From this it follows that if there is nothing at all to restrict something from happening, it must be possible. Now what about the move from 3 to 5? At first this looks suspect, but clearly in a state of nothingness there is absolutely nothing, this is what it means for to be nothingness. So in such a state, the possible factor in determining whether or not something can come into being out of nothing would be the nature of non-being itself, for nothing else exists. So given that 3 proves that there cannot be anything about nothingness to restrict something from coming into being out of it, what follows is 5, that there are no restrictions at all on something coming into being out of nothing. The conclusion of the argument finally follows that it is possible for something to come into being out of nothing. Note that this is not to say that nothingness causes something to come into being, rather it is to say that something comes into being uncaused out of nothing, for nothing being able to cause something would be a primary positive property of nothingness (however even if the theist argues that this is a secondary positive property, at best he will succeed in pushing this objection away from (1), only to "loop it on" to the end of the KCA! The atheist could agree with the premises of the KCA and simply say that nothingness is the cause of the universe). Now this conclusion not only serves as a positive objection to 1A, but also to (1). For while proving 1A does not prove (1) because B must be established, disproving 1A also disproves (1) for B does not need to be established. To prove (1) you must show that everything that begins to exist has a cause, but to disprove it, all you need is a single example of something beginning to exist uncaused. Something coming into being uncaused out of nothing provides the single example. (1) would require that non-causal beginnings are impossible, but we have just proved that at least one non-causal beginning is at least possible (and there can be no speaking of probabilities here because you need regularities to calculate probabilities, and nothingness has no regularities). William Lane Craig himself seems to agree with the general reasoning behind this argument, he just never "connects the dots" so to speak. Craig himself affirms that "As such, nothingness can have no properties, since there literally is not anything to have any properties." -Craig, Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology p.186. Now Craig must be implicitly denying the existence of negative properties because as I have shown to assert that nothing has literally no properties whatsoever would be contradictory on the existence of negative properties, for then you would be denying that nothingness has either property A or not-A, you would be saying for instance that nothingness is neither timeless nor temporal. However as A and not-A are the entire dichotomy of possibilities, this is simply contradictory. Nevertheless, the important thing is that Craig agrees with my premise 1, for primary positive properties are a member of the set of all properties. Craig even says on the same page, "Nor can anything constrain nothingness, for there is not anything to be constrained.", affirming the general idea behind my premise 2!


So I think it is well established that even if true, 1A would not prove (1), that there has not been given any good reason to think 1A is true, that there is good reason to think 1A is false, and that the falsity of 1A is a disproof of (1)! What a mess! Let's see if 1B fares any better at proving and not disproving (1).


1B faces at least two major problems. At best, 1B would prove that (1) is true for everything within the universe, but (1) necessitates that everything that begins to exist has a cause, not just things within the universe. For (1) to successfully apply to (2) in the KCA, you need (1) to also be true of the universe itself. But pointing to empirical evidence within the universe will not accomplish this, for that commits the fallacy of composition of trying to apply some property proven to be true only of the parts of a given system to the entirety of the system itself. Theists may try to dodge this objection by stating that they are making an inductive inference from observations within the universe to conclusions about the universe itself or states without the universe. But this clearly won't work, that would be an extremely poor inference to make, equivalent to inferring that because all objects float in deep space, therefore all objects will float everywhere. Simply put, conditions in any state apart from the universe would be so radically different from the way reality works in the universe that such an inductive inference would be so weak as to be virtually entirely discountable. Our sample base is simply too limited to support the truth of (1) anywhere other than within the universe, for our entire sample base is within the universe.


The other problem with 1B lies in its equivocation in supporting (1). For when we say that "everything that begins to exist has a cause" is constantly empirically confirmed and never falsified, we mean that we always observe that everything that begins to exist has a re-arranger of its previously existing material. This ex materia causation is the only type of causation that we do, and can empirically confirm, for the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Mass guarantee us that within the universe, we will never empirically observe causation ex nihilo. However when we move to (2) in the KCA, we are not just talking about a rearrangement of previously existing material, but a creation of entirely new material itself. We only empirically confirm causation ex materia, but (2) requires causation ex nihilo. In response to this objection, William Lane Craig replies that he means by "cause" something which brings about its effects, this is empirically confirmed and will apply unequivocally throughout the argument. The problem is that now the equivocation rests on the word "effects". The usage of the term "effect" that is confirmed empirically is a rearrangement of previously existing material, not a creation of entirely new material. So the premise that has empirical support is "everything that begins to exist has something that brings about a rearrangement of its previously existing material" not "everything that begins to exist has something that brings about a creation of its entirely new material". However since the KCA needs to support the second formulation of (1), not the first, there is no empirical support for any non-equivocating formulation of (1).


In conclusion then, the two arguments 1A and 1B both fail in their attempts to provide support for the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. 1A would not support (1) even if it were true, there is no good reason to think that it is true, there is good reason to think that it is not true, and this provides us with an objection to not only 1A but (1) as well. 1B provides no support for (1) outside of the universe, and does not provide support for any non-equivocating formulation of (1). It seems to me no great wonder then that defenders of the Kalam Cosmological Argument try to shift attention away from the first premise and toward the "more crucial" and "more controversial" second premise.


Resources
  1. Arguing About Gods, Graham Oppy
  2. The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, Craig and Sinclair
  3. The Poverty of Theistic Cosmology, Adolf Grunbaum
  4. Refuting the Kalam Cosmological Argument, rationesola.blogspot.com, http://rationesola.blogspot.com/2011/03/refuting-kalam-cosmological-argument.html